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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS - FALSE
REPRESENTATION IN OBTAINING CONFESSION HELD VIOLATION OF
DUE PRocEss.-Following an indictment for first degree murder,
defendant telephoned his close friend, a patrolman, and admitted the
crime. Surrendering the following day, defendant was questioned for
eight hours without counsel despite repeated requests to see his
attorney, and ultimately confessed on the false representation that the
phone call had jeopardized his friend's position. The United States
Supreme Court in reversing the New York Court of Appeals 1 held
the use of such confession violated the "traditional principles" of due
process. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, state criminal
proceedings were comparatively unhampered by constitutional re-
straints.2 The only constitutional limitations of any significance in
these proceedings were those found in the first article relating to
ex post facto laws and bills of attainder.3 Subsequent to the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment and up to the present day, states con-
tinue to regulate their own criminal procedure, for it is the "very
essence of our federalism that the States should have the widest lati-
tude in the administration of their own systems of criminal justice." 4
In 1936 irregular practices in state criminal proceedings led the
United States Supreme Court to regulate the admissibility of allegedly
coerced confessions.5 In Brown v. Mississippi, physical force em-
ployed in extracting confessions was held violative of due process.
Such means can never be used to obtain evidence to convict a
defendant.7
In regard to the use of psychological force in obtaining confes-
sions, the Supreme Court has stated various norms to determine at
I People v. Spano, 4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958).
2 Gorfinkel, The Fourteenth Amendment and State Criminal Proceedings-
"Ordered Liberty" or "Just Deserts," 41 CALIF. L. REV. 672 (1953).
3 "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
4 Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 468 (1958). See Brown v. New
Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899), wherein states are free to regulate procedure in
their own courts so long as they are not in conflict with due process and
fundamental principles of liberty and justice.
5 See 39 CORNELL L.Q. 321 (1954). At the same time, the Supreme Court
has recognized a narrower control over state criminal cases than that which
it possesses over the federal courts. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 n.1
(1949).
6 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
7 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940) ; People v. Barbato, 254 N.Y. 170, 172 N.E. 458 (1930).
In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) (dissenting opinion),
it was stated that American courts almost universally hold "that a confession
obtained during or shortly after the confessor has been subjected to brutality,
torture, beating, starvation, or physical pain of any kind is prima facie
'involuntary'." At the turn of the century, the test for the admissibility of a
confession was its trustworthiness. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613
(1896). See also Comments, 27 FORDHAm L. Rav. 396 (1958).
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what point this method violates due process. The court is not bound
by the finding of the jury as to the voluntariness of a confession.
From the evidence introduced, it will make an independent finding
on the undisputed facts.8
Following the decision in the Brown case the Supreme Court
applied the test of "fairness," stating that "the aim of the require-
ment of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence,
but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether
true or false." 9 It is invoked to determine if a fair risk exists that
the confession is false.10 This criterion for due process has not been
changed by subsequent norms and is found in recent decisions."
In 1944 the United States Supreme Court handed down a new
test in Ashcraft v. Tennessee.12 The defendant was questioned for
thirty-six hours by relays of officers and investigators. This method
of questioning as shown by the uncontradicted evidence is "inherently
coercive" and thus violates due process.' 8 Its very existence comes in
conflict with the full use of mental freedom,14 which depends on
whether the accused, at the time he confesses, has the use of his
faculties to enable him freely to confess or deny participation in a
crime.15 However, the bare fact of police detention and examination
in private does not render a confession so obtained involuntary.' 6
What constitutes inherent coercion must depend on the circumstances
of each case.' 7
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court have indicated an
embodiment of past principles in a subjective test. In Stein v. New
York,' 8 the conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court over peti-
tioners' objection that psychological pressure in repeated interroga-
tion was used to overpower their mental resistance and induced an
involuntary confession. 19 The extent of psychological pressure in any
8 Chambers v. Florida, supra note 7; accord, Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945).
9 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); accord, Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
10 Lisenba v. California, supra note 9, at 236. See 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE
§§823-24 (3d ed. 1940).
11 Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); United States v. Claudy,
204 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1953); Palakiko v. Hawaii, 188 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1951).
12 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
13 Id. at 154.
14 Ibid.
15 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
16 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). See Balbo v. People, 80
N.Y. 484 (1880) (denying involuntariness of a confession made during illegal
arrest).
17 See notes 24-27 infra.
18346 U.S. 156 (1953).
19 Id. at 184. See 39 CORNELL L.Q. 321 (1954), wherein it was stated that
as a result of the Stein opinion, there would be a narrower interpretation
of the due process clause, the according of great weight to the determination
of the jury and a return to the trustworthy theory.
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case must depend upon a "weighing of the circumstances of pressure
against the power of resistance of the person confessing. What would
be overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be utterly in-
effective against an experienced criminal." 20
In Fikes v. Alabama,21 petitioner, an uneducated Negro, was
taken to a state prison far from home, held incommunicado for one
week and given neither preliminary hearing nor the right to consult
counsel. The Supreme Court reversed the state conviction using the
same test as was expounded in affirming the Stein conviction.
The Payne v. Arkansas 2 decision of 1958 encompassed prior
norms and tests in applying the "totality" theory. Petitioner, a
mentally dull youth, was denied a hearing, held incommunicado for
three days and denied food for a long period of time. In addition,
he was threatened with mob violence, after which he confessed. The
Supreme Court held: "it seems obvious from the totality of this
course of conduct . . . that the confession was coerced and did not
constitute an "expression of free choice,' and that its use before the
jury ... deprived him of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the
very concept of justice' .... " 23
The norms supply only a workable theory. The defendant's
educational background,24 literacy,25 and age,28 along with incessant
interrogation,27 are the most important factors in the application of
the theory.
In the Spano opinion the state was attempting to obtain a con-
fession in a different setting. The state was not merely attempting
to solve the crime or to gather evidence upon which to indict, as in
the cases outlined above, but rather, a grand jury had already found
sufficient cause to return an indictment against Spano. The police
were trying to procure additional information upon which to con-
vict him.
20 Stein v. New York, supra note 18, at 185. See Gorfinkel, The Fourteenth
Amendment and State Criminal Proceedings-"Ordered Liberty" or "Just
Deserts," 41 CALIF. L. REv. 672 (1953). The test of due process is not whether
proceedings were consistent with fundamental guarantees but whether de-
fendant got what he deserved.
21352 U.S. 191 (1957).
22 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
23 Id. at 567. (Emphasis added.) A confession by which life is taken
must be an expression of free choice. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
24 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (involving a law student);
Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (concerning an ignorant Negro) ; Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
25 Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) ; White v. Texas, 310 U.S.
530 (1940) (concerns confessions of an illiterate farmhand). But see Gallegos
v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) (dictum), where a confession may be vol-
untary notwithstanding accused's illiteracy.
26 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940).
27 Harris v. South Carolina, supra note 25; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1944) ; Chambers v. Florida, supra note 26.
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Does deception render a confession involuntary? 28 New York
cases do not exclude confessions if procured by deceptive means
provided they were voluntarily made.2 9 The fact that deception was
employed is not sufficient to justify withholding a confession from
the jury's consideration, and the confession may be the basis of a
guilty verdict if not subject to other objections.8" The question is
whether petitioner was induced to utter a falsehood or "felt compelled
to speak for any reason when he preferred to remain silent." 31
In a circuit court case,8 2 defendant was held incommunicado for
forty hours and confronted by three people who were actually detec-
tives falsely pretending to identify him as the person engaged in the
crime. The confession was not admitted as evidence of his guilt
because of other factors, but the court maintained the New York rule
as a general principle. Alone or together neither the prolonged de-
tention nor the perpetrated deception was sufficient to nullify a con-
fession as unconstitutionally procured. These are relevant factors in
undermining the due process concept.83
The method used in obtaining the confession was an issue in
Leyra v. Denno.34 A psychiatrist as a paid representative of New
York State was falsely presented as a doctor, and by persistent,
skillful and suggestive questioning inducing a trance-like state, a
confession was obtained. The state was using the "doctor"-patient
relationship as a continuation of the police effort to induce petitioner
to confess. The extracting of a confession in such a inanner is more
than deception and therefore not consistent with due process.8 5
Various state courts have decided that deception alone cannot be
a basis for inadmissibility. 0 As in coerced confessions, the confes-
28 The Spano opinion was based largely on the deception perpetrated on
the defendant. See N.Y. CODE CRuI. PROC. § 395: "A confession of a de-
fendant, whether in the course of judicial proceeding or to a private person,
an be given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear
produced by threats, or unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney,
that he shall not be prosecuted therefor; but is not sufficient to warrant his
conviction, without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed."
29 People v. White, 176 N.Y. 331, 68 N.E. 630 (1903). Here there was
a pretense of being accused's friend. Accord, People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353,
98 N.E.2d 553 (1951). See People v. Wentz, 37 N.Y. 303 (1867) (dictum).
30 People v. Buffom, 214 N.Y. 53, 108 N.E. 184 (1915).
31 People v. White, szpra note 29, at 349, 68 N.E. at 636. New York pro-
cedure for excluding coerced confessions relies heavily on the jury. There is a
preliminary hearing whereby the judge must exclude any confession that he
deems to be involuntary. If he finds an issue of voluntariness, and presents a
question of fact, he must receive the confession and submit it to the jury with
proper instructions as to its voluntary character. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156, 172 (1953) ; People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E. 112 (1909).32 United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955).
3 Id. at 700-01. See also Lewis v. United States, 74 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.
1934).
34 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
35 Ibid. See generally N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 352 which prohibits the
disclosure by a physician of professional knowledge.36 State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 28 N.W.2d 475 (1947) ; Commonwealth v.
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sion through deception relates to method and circumstance. Was
there such an inducement to the defendant that the confession may
be involuntary? 37
Spano, an uneducated, foreign born citizen, faced massive official
interrogation for eight hours culminating in the deception. His
patrolman friend played the part of a worried father, harried by his
superiors; this barrage was conducted in four relays, the last one
extending for one hour. After considering all the facts in their
post-indictment setting the Court concluded that petitioner's will was
overborn by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused.38
The concurring opinions in Spano v. New York were based on
the defendant's right to counsel. The due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment does not contain the specific guarantees that are
given to citizens in federal prosecutions by the sixth amendment.39
The clause constitutes a less rigid and more fluid concept than that
contained in the Bill of Rights.40 But the Supreme Court has held
that the right to counsel is not to be limited to the period of the trial
itself.41 Two recent decisions by this Court 42 have limited the con-
cept. The defendants are not entitled to counsel at every stage of
the pre-trial proceeding. Such a doctrine would render criminal en-
forcement difficult in precluding police questioning without counsel.4
Green, 302 Mass. 547, 20 N.E.2d 417 (1939). But see Macon v. Common-
wealth, 187 Va. 363, 46 S.E.2d 396 (1948) (dictum). For decisions in various
states, see 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 841 n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
37 See People v. White, 176 N.Y. 331, 68 N.E. 630 (1903). If a coerced
confession was admitted, will the judgment be set aside even though there is
other evidence apart from the confession? Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401 (1945), answered this in the affirmative although in Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156, 188 (1953), it appeared that the opposite conclusion was reached.
This, however, was dictum since the Stein opinion held the confession to be
voluntary.
The Spano opinion, discussing this point, stated that "Stein held only
that when a confession is not found by this Court to be involuntary, this
Court will not reverse on the ground that the jury might have found it in-
voluntary and might have relied on it." Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
324 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
38 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
39 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). FED. R. CRIM. P. 44 provides:
"[I]f the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him
of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of
the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain
counsel."
-0 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
41 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ; accord, People ex rel. Burgess
v. Risley, 66 How. Pr. 67 (1883). The petitioner was not indicted at the
time when he requested right to counsel; held, everyone accused of or arrested
for a crime is entitled to counsel during the entire stage of the proceeding.
Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E. 773 (1920).
42 Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) ; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433 (1958).
43 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoC. § 308 provides that if the defendant anpear for
arraignment without counsel, he must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel,
and if he does the court must assign counsel.
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In both cases during the questioning the defendants had not been in-
dicted and were considered suspects rather than defendants. Refus-
ing counsel in the pre-trial stage violates due process only if the
accused is so prejudiced thereby that his subsequent trial would lack
basic fairness. 44 The circumstances of each particular case must be
considered.45
The majority in the Spano opinion advanced a new test to be
applied in determining the admissibility of confessions. The courts
must now examine whether the confession obtained is in accord with
the "traditional principles" of due process. There is no criterion or
definition given by the Supreme Court, but on the basis of this study
of the recent trend of decisions, the "traditional principle" test ap-
pears to be an embodiment of the "fundamental fairness" and "inher-
ently coercive" tests as well as the "totality" norm. It is the first
time the Court has so vigorously denounced the use of deceptive
practices in extracting confessions and emphasized that the events
surrounding the confession took place after a grand jury had found
cause to indict him. The result is to be commended. However, it
is also possible that the decision might result in an interference with
state criminal enforcement if it were construed to mean that no
police questioning at all could occur in the absence of counsel. Perhaps
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas sets a good norm. He
states that once Spano had been indicted for a capital crime and was
no longer a mere suspect, he was at that point entitled to counsel
under the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.
M
DEFAMATION - BROADCASTER'S LIABILITY - § 315 OF FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS ACT IMPLIES COMPLETE IMMUNITY. -On the
basis of a statement made by a political candidate during a campaign
broadcast, defendant-broadcaster was sued for libel. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that Section 315 of the Fed-
eral Communications Act ' rendered the station immune from lia-
bility. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed. On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, held, since section 315 prohibits
the broadcaster from censoring political broadcasts, the privilege of
immunity from liability "must follow as a corollary." Farmers Educ.
and Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
44 Crooker v. California, supra note 42, at 439; see Lisenba v. California.
314 U.S. 219 (1941) (dictum).
45 See, e.g., Crooker v. California, supra note 42, at 440; House v. Mayo,
324 U.S. 42 (1945).
148 Stat. 1088 (1934) (amended by 66 Stat. 717 (1952), as amended,
47 U.S.C. §315 (1952)).
